Title: Religion, Economic Concerns, and African American Immigration Attitudes

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Abstract

The current study assesses the relationship between exposure to political cues from clergy and African American immigration attitudes. At first glance, these findings suggests that the more political messages that blacks hear from their clergy, the more critical they are of the immigrant presence. However, a more critical look at the data suggest that these political messages only sway the immigration attitudes of blacks that are worried about their own or the nation's economic well being. This may suggests that economically concerned African Americans are particularly sensitive to political cues that emphasize policies, immigration being among them, that may threaten African American life chances.

Introduction

This study assesses the impact clergy have on the immigration attitudes of African Americans. U.S trade policies with Mexico between 1986 and 1994 contributed to the dramatic increase in the ethnic diversity of American cities and subsequent contact between native born blacks and Hispanic immigrants, the largest immigrant group in the U.S. (Massey, 2008; Wise & Cypher, 2007). Between 1980 and 2004, Mexican immigration increased by fivefold to 10.2 million in 2004. Many of the poor and working class Hispanic immigrants that find their way to urban areas are responding to trade policies, NAFTA in particular, that make it difficult for them to lead a quality life in their native countries. The 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement effectively integrated the markets of Mexico, the U.S., and Canada, thereby making it easier for capital inputs to flow across these borders. While U.S. factories are able to produce cheaper goods by locating in countries with lower operational costs, these policies have been costly for Mexican workers, small and medium-sized businesses, and, the poor. U.S. transnationals in Mexico often undercut suppliers by importing their own capital and materials. In addition, these companies often pay less than the cost of living in areas in which their plants are located (Wise & Cypher, 2007). These practices have had the effect of weakening local economies and governments' capacity to provide services, which, in turn, encourages Mexican emigration. Many of these migrants land in urban American communities where they compete with poor and working class blacks for low and semi-skilled jobs.

The position taken on immigration by the National Baptist Convention, the oldest and largest black denomination in the U.S, highlights the conflict between the black Church's theological commitment to fighting for the oppressed and their historical role in advocating for black Americans (Mock 2006). In, Immigration and Mission Matters: Framing Our Response,

Rev. Charles E. Mock, the Executive Secretary of the Home Mission Board of the National Baptist Convention, maintains that national boundaries are artificial man made lines that should not limit access to a quality of life befitting all God's children. Nonetheless, Mock (2006) also spoke to the realities of persistent black poverty and increasing competition over jobs and wages between blacks and immigrants.

Economic competition with immigrants is a real concern for the membership of many Black churches. National data reports that blacks are more fearful than are whites of immigrants taking desirable jobs from Americans (Doherty 2006). Blacks are also more likely than are whites to say that they or a family member have lost a job, or not gotten a job, because an employer hired an immigrant worker (Doherty 2006). These experiences are consistent with research that suggests that employers prefer immigrants over native born blacks because they believe that immigrants have a greater work ethic and are willing to work for less pay under worse conditions (Holzer, 1999). Some scholars argue that the above conditions contributed to immigrants having had a depressing effect on black wages over the past twenty years (Borjas, Grogger & Hanson, 2007). And, so, in many respects, prophetic black Churches are increasingly caught between a theology that espouses helping strangers in need and meeting the needs of their disproportionately poor congregant base that are increasingly competing with immigrants for jobs and wages.

During the 2000s, black church leaders and groups have largely been absent from nationally coordinated marches and conferences that pushed for increased freedom of movement and access to work, social services, and education for immigrants. And, outside of the National Baptist Church U.S.A., Black Church leaders have not offered official statements or passed resolutions on this issue. The silence of Black Church leaders and groups on the immigration

issue may point to the Black Church's top priority in battling poverty related ills within black communities with limited resources. Their absence may also signal a hesitancy to take prophetic stands on issues that they believe will threaten the already precarious economic position of their congregants and African Americans as a whole.

Because of the lack of discussion on immigration among African American clergy leadership at the national level, the position that many local African American clergy may take on this issue is unclear. It is also unclear if the immigration–related political cues that some clergy deliver during sermons have any impact on their congregants' immigration attitudes. By political cues, this study refers to persuasive messages delivered by political leaders in an effort to inform and shape the policy attitudes of followers. It is particularly important to assess the impact of clergy cues on such attitudes because few citizens have the time and perhaps interests to thoroughly research the pros and cons of the policy issues of the day (Converse, 1964; Downs, 1957; Kinder, 1983). In addition, because of blacks' relatively low level of education and isolation within resource poor communities with few civic institutions, black churches are key sources of political information for many blacks (Harris, 1999; Lincoln & Mamiya, 1990).

At this point, there is no comprehensive theory that explains how religion impacts the immigration attitudes of racial/ethnic minority groups. System blame theory may provide some assistance in this regard. System blame suggests that structural forces, such as a history of oppression, unfair laws, lack of policy attention, and the like are responsible for racial inequality (Reese & Brown 1995). There is evidence that politically conscious black churches reinforce such attitudes among African Americans by emphasizing power inequities and racial identity (Reese & Brown 1995). The most referenced example of black church leaders delivering system blame cues is that of activist churches during the modern day civil rights movement that framed

the federal government's failure to enforce the Bill of Rights as being responsible for black oppression (Morris 1984). It is plausible that some blacks that hear political sermons and/or announcements that highlight the disadvantaged position of blacks may make cognitive connections to immigrants. The relatively high levels of poverty in black communities combined with African American perceptions that immigrants are taking jobs may contribute to an interpretation among some blacks that immigrant economic maneuverings are representative of an antagonistic structuring of society against black (Doherty, 2006). Under this scenario, immigrants represent another external force that that threatens the economic life chances of African Americans. At this point, however, one can only speculate about the relationship between exposure to political cues from clergy and African American immigration attitudes. The proposed study attempts to fill this gap in the literature.

Religion and Immigration Attitudes

Alport's (1944) theory of prejudice suggests that for dominant groups, religion serves a dual role in promoting and challenging racial/ethnic prejudice. On the one hand, members of dominant religions are more prejudiced than are members of minority religions. However, the more religiously involved people are, the more open they are to out-groups. Alport (1944) argues that highly religious person tend to have an intrinsic commitment to a faith's core teaching of love and compassion. In contrast, members of dominant groups that are marginally attached to religion tend to claim religious identification for social status purposes. Consistent with Alport's theory of religion and prejudice, a growing body of research suggests that Protestants have more conservative immigration attitudes than do Jews, Mormons, and other minority religious groups (Brenneman, 2005; Knoll, 2009). In addition, the more individuals attend houses of worship the more supportive they are of legalizing immigrants and the less

supportive they are of limiting the number of immigrants to the United States (Brenneman, 2005; Daniels & von der Ruhr 2005; Knoll 2009). Given the research done on religious context and congregant attitudes, clergy cues are likely to inform the immigration attitudes of congregants. This body of work largely suggests that clergy have a substantive impact on the ideology and policy attitudes of their congregants (Brenneman, 2005; Daniels & von der Ruhr, 2005; Gilbert, 1993; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, & Sprague, 1993; Smith, 2005).

Nonetheless, the role that religion plays in shaping the immigrant attitudes of African Americans remains unclear. As mentioned earlier, the role of political black churches in reinforcing a system blame perspective among African Americans offers the most to glean from. These churches reinforce awareness among blacks of their common racial experience and identity as a marginalized group and power inequities between the blacks and non-blacks (Reese & Brown 1996). In doing so, blacks come to recognize the role that institutions, such as the legal system, government, and economic systems, in limiting black economic mobility. Even if clergy do not specifically speak on immigration, discussing a need to mobilize against candidates and policies that attempt to weaken opportunity structures for African Americans may contribute to some blacks seeing immigrants as an obstruction to black mobility.

Implicit in the assumption that exposure to political messages from clergy influences black immigration attitudes is that congregants pick up on and are influenced by political cues delivered by clergy. It is likely that congregants are willing to consider the policy arguments put forth by their clergy leadership because of the social capital that exists in most congregations. The presence of social capital within houses of worship assumes that congregants trust that their clergy are speaking and acting in their best interests. Because Americans are able to choose their congregations, congregations are, for many, a source of friendships and social support with

people of shared of interests and backgrounds (Taylor & Chatters, 1986). Moreover, to the extent that churchgoers are encouraged by their clergy and fellow congregants to consider a given policy, many give it thought trusting that their clergy are acting in their best interests as well as that of their church community and larger society (Brown & Brown, 2003). In addition to the role of trust and obligation, inducements from fellow congregants to consider a given set of policy issues are often effective because such appeals are often culturally relevant (Harris, 1999). That is, politically conscious clergy often make policy arguments within the contexts of common songs, communication styles, and religious narratives that hold special meaning to their ethno-religious group.

Economic Interests and Interpretation of Clergy Cues

To be clear, clergy cues are not always understood by congregants in the way clergy intend or by all congregants in the same manner. According to attribution theory, individuals often search for the motives behind statements made by political leaders, such as clergy, in an effort to align their ideologies with that of trusted leaders and distance themselves from others (Kelly, 1967; Weiner, 1980. The social group position and ideology of the listener, the actual message, and the perceived ideological perspective of political leaders often impacts how individuals interpret messages from such leaders (Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994). The African American racial heuristic is a key shortcut that informs how many blacks interpret the motives behind statements made by political leaders (Dawson, 1994). This heuristic suggests that a history of racial oppression and persistent racial inequality contributes to blacks, regardless of station in life, perceiving a linkage between their individual and racial group interest. Accordingly, policies and official practices that positively or adversely impact the group are seen as proxies for individual self interest. As mentioned earlier, activists black churches tend to

reinforce racial group interests among blacks by emphasizing the ways in which blacks as a group suffer from institutional racism. Data from the 1993 National Black Politics Study (NBPS) (Dawson, Brown, & Jackson, 1998) suggests that blacks that are concerned with the economic condition of their racial group are particularly sensitive to system blame cues from clergy. It is not implausible that those with such heightened concerns would also be particularly likely to interpret such cues in a manner that places some blame on immigrants and immigration policy for the social-economically disadvantaged position of African Americans.

Interestingly, data from the 1993 NBPS (Dawson, Brown, & Jackson, 1998) also suggests that blacks that worried about their own job security are also more likely to pick up on system blame cues at places of worship. This may suggest that many African Americans view their individual experiences as being linked to their affiliation with a racially marginalized group. As opposed to blacks viewing their individual economic hardship as being solely linked to a lack of effort and/or other misfortunes, many may also attribute such hardship to structural barriers that make it difficult for blacks as a whole to succeed. Similar to blacks that are concerned about the plight of the racial group, African Americans that are concerned with their individual economic well-being may also interpret system blame cues from clergy in a manner that is critical of the impact of immigrants and immigration policies on black social-economic well-being.

However, it is unlikely that concerns about the nation's economy impact how blacks interpret and apply political cues from clergy to their immigration attitudes. The African American racial group heuristic is largely a function of white hegemony and mainstream legal, economic, and governmental institutions that are perceived as maintaining such dominance. Given that political messages by clergy tend to place blame on mainstream institutions for racial inequality, it is unlikely that blacks with national economic worries are particularly likely to

interpret clergy cues in a manner that places blame on immigrants for the social-economically disadvantaged position of blacks. This leads to the following hypotheses;

Hypotheses

H1: Overall, the more political messages that blacks hear from clergy, the more critical they are of the presence of immigrants in this country.

H2: Hearing political messages from clergy has a stronger effect on the immigration attitudes of blacks that are worried about their economic well-being than those that are not.

H:3 Hearing political messages from clergy has a stronger effect on the immigration attitudes of blacks that are worried about the economic well-being of their racial group than are those that are not.

H_0: Hearing political messages from clergy will *not* have have a different effect on the immigration attitudes of blacks that are worried about the economic well-being of the nation relative to those that are not.

Sample

This study utilizes the 2004 National Politics Study (NPS) to test the relationship between clergy messages and immigration attitudes. The primary goal of the NPS is to gather comparative data about individuals' political attitudes, beliefs, aspirations, and behaviors at the beginning of the 21st century. The Program for Research on Black Americans of the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research went into the field in September 2004, shortly before the Presidential election and concluded a few months later in February 2005. All of the 3,309 interviews were conducted over the telephone. The interviews were conducted in either English or Spanish, depending on the preference of the respondent, and the overall response rate is 31%.[1]

[1] This is comparable to the median response rate (30%) reported by Groves (2006) in his study of over 200 response rates in thirty-five published articles.

The NPS is the first multi-racial and multi-ethnic national study of political and racial attitudes. This study is based on a national sample of individuals, aged 18 years or older, from a variety of different racial and ethnic groups. Interviews occurred throughout the United States in urban and rural centers of the country where significant numbers of Black Americans reside. In total, 756 African Americans, 919 non-Hispanic Whites, 757 Hispanics, and 503 Asian Americans were interviewed. An additional 404 Afro-Caribbean respondents were also interviewed. As mentioned earlier, the current study only focuses on African Americans.

Because the poor and least educated tend to live in households without telephones, low-income and less-educated Blacks are underrepresented in the NPS. In addition, this study over-represents black women by roughly 13%. Black women tend to be overrepresented in surveys because black men are less likely than are women to be attached to black households (Tate, 2004). The mean age for the African Americans in the NPS is 46 years, 63% are female, and 27% have a college degree. Weights have been applied to adjust for the actual social-demographic characteristics of the population as measured in the 2000 Census.

Measures

Dependent Variables: *Immigration Attitudes*

To assess immigrant attitudes, respondents were asked to report if they believe that; immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America, the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be decreased, and if there should be increased spending to patrol the border against illegal immigrants. All of these measures are dichotomously measured.

Independent Variables: *Exposure to Political Messages from Clergy*

Respondents' exposure to political messages in their houses of worship from clergy is measured by a two item index that assesses if, in the last year, a member of their clergy, or someone in an official position, ever suggested that they take some action on a political issue, such as sign a petition, write a letter, attend a protest, march, or demonstration, or get in touch with a public official; and if their clergy encouraged them to vote for a certain candidate. Taken together, the *clergy political message* index maintains a modest alpha score of .52 and ranges from zero to two with two indicating that respondents were exposed to both types of political messages.

Economic Concerns

Respondents' concern about their individual economic being is measured by the proportion of individuals that are worried about losing their job in the near future. Respondents' concern for the economic well-being of their racial group and nation are measured by the proportion that believed that the economic position of their racial group and nation, respectively, worsened over the past year.

Interaction Variables

The interaction variables are the products of the clergy message variable multiplied by each of the economic worry variables. These variables will allow this study to assess if clergy messages have a different effect on the immigration attitudes of individuals that have economic worries relative to those that do not.

Control Variables

In an attempt to replicate the analytical approach of past studies on religion and policy attitudes, the current study controls for; frequency of church attendance, denominational affiliation, college education, family income, gender, and Southern residence.[2]

Statistical Methods

Because all of the dependent variables are dichotomous, this study employs odds ratios derived from logit regression analyses to the test the above hypothesis. This study also utilizes predicted probability estimates based upon the logit regression analyses to further illustrate the relationship between clergy messages and immigration attitudes. These estimates are based upon the following formula; $Pr(y=1|\ \overline{X}\ , \max x_k) - Pr(y=1|\ \overline{X}\ , \min x_k)$, in which Y represents immigration attitudes and X represents exposure to political messages.

Results

Main Effects

The bivariate and multivariate data presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively largely support the study's first hypothesis that exposure to political messages from one's clergy contributes to blacks maintaining critical immigration attitudes. More specifically, the more political messages that blacks hear from their clergy, the more likely they are to believe that immigrants take jobs from Americans, to support a reduction in the number of immigrants in the country, and to support the patrolling of boarders for illegal immigrants. By and large, the economic worry and social-demographic measures are fairly inconsistent predictors of black immigration attitudes.

Tables 1 &2 Here

[2] Missing values for family income were imputed from an imputation procedure that organizes missing cases by patterns of missing data so that the missing-value regressions can be conducted efficiently. The imputations did not significantly or substantively alter the analyses.

Interaction Effects

Tables 3-5 provide a more critical look at the data and largely suggest that political pronouncements of clergy only impact the immigration attitudes of blacks that have individual and national economic worries. The first significant interaction variable reported in Table 3 suggest that hearing political messages in church has a stronger effect on the belief that immigrants take jobs from Americans among blacks that are worried about their economic well-being than among those that have no such worry. In this model, the main-effect coefficient of clergy messages represent the odds of increasing levels of exposure to political messages from clergy affecting attitudes about immigrants taking jobs from Americans when worry about individual economic well being is zero (i.e. people that are not worried about their employment future). This main effect is not significantly different from zero, indicating that clergy messages do not influence views of African Americans that are worried about their economic future. On the other hand, among those with such worries, hearing political messages increases agreement with the statement that immigrants take jobs from Americans. These effects are most clearly seen in Table 4 in which clergy messages contribute to blacks believing that immigrants take jobs from Americans among those that are worried about their economic future. However, there is no such relationship among blacks that are not worried. The predicted probability estimates listed in Table 5 report that among blacks that have individual economic worries, hearing both types of political messages from their clergy have about a 34% greater probability of believing that immigrants take jobs from native born Americans than African Americans that have not been exposed to any political messages. There is only a 6% increase in probability among those with no such worries.

The second significant interaction effect reported in Table 3 suggest that hearing political messages in church has a stronger effect on support for decreasing the number of immigrants in this country among blacks that are worried about their economic future than among those that have no such worries. Moreover, Table 4 suggests that while clergy messages do not influence support for reducing immigrants among African Americans that are not worried about their economic future, it increases levels of support among those that are worried. And, Table 5 indicates that African Americans that report hearing both types of political messages have about a 38% greater probability to support a reduction in immigrants than individuals who have not been exposed to any political messages. There is only a 6% increase in probability among those with no such worries.

The last significant interaction effect reported in Table 3 suggests that hearing political messages in church has a stronger effect on support for increasing spending to patrol the borders among blacks that are worried about the nation's economy than among those that have no such worries. Table 4 reports that while clergy messages do not influence support for border patrol among African Americans that are not worried about the nation's economy, it increases levels of support among those that are worried. And, Table 5 shows that African Americans who report hearing both types of political messages from their clergy have about a 19% greater probability to support border patrol than African Americans who have not been exposed to any political messages. There is only a 5% increase in probability among those with no such worries. At first glance, these findings suggests that the more political messages that blacks hear from their clergy, the more critical they are of the immigrant presence. However, a more critical look at the data suggest that these political messages only sway the immigration attitudes of blacks that are worried about their own or the nation's economic well being.

Tables 3-5 Here

Discussion

The current study builds upon research that points to the impact of clergy on the policy attitudes and political ideology of their congregants (Brenneman, 2005; Daniels & von der Ruhr, 2005; Gilbert, 1993; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, & Sprague, 1993; Smith, 2005). This study goes a step beyond such studies, however, by assessing the impact of clergy cues on the out-group attitudes of a racial/ethnic minority group. At first glance, African Americans that attend congregations in which clergy encourage them to take political action appear to have critical immigration attitudes. At its core, clergy attempts to influence the immigration attitudes of congregants work because of the social and cultural capital resources within their congregations. It stands to reason that congregants are open to the policy arguments put forth by clergy because they trust their clergy to act in their best interest. In addition, many clergy make their case in support or opposition to public policies in a manner that resonates with the social-cultural experience of the social group (Harris 1999; Lincoln & Mamiya 1990; Patillo-McCoy, 1999).

While the social and cultural capital resources found within congregations likely account for the influence of politically conscious clergy on African American immigration attitudes, the system blame cues delivered by clergy likely influence the *direction* of such attitudes. The system blame approach emphasizes the role structural forces, such as limited access to jobs, quality education, quality legal representation, and the like in accounting for blacks' relatively poor social-economic standing (Reese & Brown, 1995). From the civil rights movement to local grassroots political movements today, activist black church leaders have often framed the necessity of political engagement around a need to prophetically challenge economic, legal, and governmental systems that restrict African American life chances (Harris, 1999; Patillo-McCoy,

1999; Morris, 1984). The current study suggests that the extent to which congregants hear political cues from clergy, congregants likely interpret such cues in a manner that places some blame on immigrants for the relatively poor socioeconomic condition of African Americans. To be clear, this study cannot definitively state that clergy are preaching sermons that directly link immigrants to the relatively poor social-economic position of blacks. However, past research has found that even when specific policy issues are not mentioned, clergy are effective in influencing the ideological worldview of their congregants (Smith, 2005). Thus, even if clergy do not preach on immigration, blacks are open to applying system blame cues transmitted from clergy to their beliefs about immigrants.

A more critical look at the data suggests that the importance of clergy cues to black immigration attitudes is limited to those with individual and national economic concerns. Consistent with Kuklinaki and Hurley's (1994) research, this study suggests that the ideological and social-economic position of blacks impacts the motives and, subsequent interpretations, they attribute to statements made by political leaders. Based upon perceptions of personal economic worries, it is plausible that two African American congregants could hear the same political message from clergy and come away with different interpretations of how such messages apply to their immigration attitudes. Blacks that perceive themselves as being economically vulnerable are particularly likely to pick up on cues that place blame on external forces, immigration policies being among them, that limit black life chances. Consistent with the racial heuristic thesis, this finding may be a consequence of many blacks linking their economic experiences to their affiliation with a racially marginalized group that faces systemic obstacles to finding jobs and decent wages. To that end, many economically concerned blacks may view the underlying motive behind critical statements on immigrants made by their clergy as a warning about the

impending threat that immigrants pose to their economic life chances. On the other hand, blacks that are economically secure either are not picking up on such system blame cues and/or view the motivation behind such statements as merely informative discussions on obstacles to racial equality.

For blacks with individual economic concerns, a tension seemingly exists between the activists black Church's commitment to a prophetic theology that calls them to speak and act with and for the oppressed with the ways in which they apply clergy cues to their immigration attitudes. This conflict may stem from the lack of critical discussion among clergy leadership at the denominational and congregational level that links economic exploitation of developing countries by western corporations to the global poor immigrating to the U.S. The lack of such critical discussion likely has much to do with the inadequate organizational resources of many black denominational bodies (Baer & Singer, 2002). Unlike the Catholic, Mainline, and Evangelical Churches, black churches do not have national and/or statewide offices dedicated to researching the implications of public policies for their congregant base and their theological principles.

In the absence of such a global perspective and discourse on immigration, some local church leaders may present a rather a myopic view to congregants that places immigrants, and not multinational corporations and pro-business trade policies, as being responsible for blacks' relatively poor social-economic standing. This study suggests that the most economically vulnerable blacks are particularly receptive to such messages. The lack of a global justice perspective on immigration transmitted from black religious and other civic leadership may provide some explanation for the inter-group hostility between working class and poor blacks and Hispanics that see themselves in completion for jobs, wages, and control of community

institutions (Vaca 2004). This social reality likely makes it difficult for social justice oriented faith groups, such as faith-based community organizing firms, to forge congregation-based political alliances between working class and poor blacks and Hispanics (Warren 2001; Wood, 2002).

It is interesting that worries about the economic well-being of the racial group do not impact the relationship between exposure to clergy political cues and black immigration attitudes but concerns about the national economy do. The racial-group heuristic of blacks suggests that the shared memory of overt racism and oppression combined with persistent racial inequality contributes to blacks' strongly connecting their self interests to that of the racial group (Dawson, 1994). In this vein, it is somewhat surprising that worries about the economic well-being of the racial group play no such moderating role, but worries about national economic well being do. These findings may reflect the coverage of immigration in the mass media. The impact of immigration on the nation's economic climate as a whole is often discussed in radio, print, and television mediums. There are much fewer stories, however, on the impact of immigration on the economic chances of specific racial/ethnic groups. Such coverage may account for differences in the interpretation and application of political messages made by clergy, as it relates to immigration, among those that are worried about the nation's economic well-being and those that are not.

At the outset, this study suggested that clergy political cues have a consistent impact on black immigration attitudes. However, a closer look at the data suggests that clergy cues only impact the immigration attitudes of blacks with individual and national economic concerns. And, so while politically active black churches are often perceived by blacks as serving a social

justice function, economically concerned African Americans tend to pick up on clergy cues that emphasize a racial group interests that, at times, pits itself in competition with immigrant groups.

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Table 1: Impact of Exposure to Political Messages from Clergy and Economic Concerns on African American Immigration Attitudes: Cross Tabulations: Chi-Square

	Immigrant Take Jobs	Support a Decrease in Immigrants	Support Border Patrol
Clergy Messages			
0 Political Messages	47.46	27.59	52.13
1 Political Messages	55.56	34.44	60.00
2 Political Messages	60.24*	39.76*	62.65#
Economic Worries			
Individual Economic Worries	46.79	29.49	58.97
No Individual Economic Worries	51.83	30.83	54.17
Racial Group Economic Worries	53.69	33.24	51.99
No Racial Group Economic Worries	48.27	28.22	57.92
National Economic Worries	51.13	32.24	53.39
No National Economic Worries	50.19	27.51	58.36
N=	756	756	756

#<.1, *<.05, **<.01

Table 2: Impact of Exposure to Political Messages from Clergy and Economic Concerns on African American Immigration Attitudes: Logit Regression Analyses: Odds Ratios

	Immigrant Take Jobs	Support a Decrease in Immigrants	Support Border Patrol
Clergy Political Messages	1.320*	1.335*	1.284*
	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.148)
Individual Economic Worries	0.762	0.909	1.283
	(0.147)	(0.188)	(0.248)
Racial Group Economic Worries	1.392#	1.208	0.833
	(0.243)	(0.224)	(0.145)
National Economic Worries	0.851	1.129	0.837
	(0.156)	(0.223)	(0.153)
Controls			
Church Attendance	1.028	0.936	1.086
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.076)
Black Protestant[3]	1.607**	1.245	1.024
	(0.249)	(0.207)	(0.159)
College Graduate	0.566**	0.820	0.904
	(0.098)	(0.154)	(0.155)
Family Income	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age	1.002	1.001	1.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Women	0.888	1.308	0.540**
	(0.148)	(0.236)	(0.091)
South	0.903	1.147	1.007
	(0.148)	(0.201)	(0.165)
Weight	1.000	1.000	1.000#
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N=	756	756	756

#<.1, *<.05, **<.01; (Standard errors are in parentheses)

[3] Individuals that affiliate with Historically Black Protestant denominations serve as the reference denomination category and are compared against all others.

Table 3: Moderating Effect of Individual, Group, National, Economic Worries on the Impact of Clergy Messages on African American Immigration Attitudes: Logit Regression Analyses: Odds Ratios

	Immigrant Take Jobs	Support a Decrease in Immigrants	Support Border Patrol
Clergy Political Messages	0.954	1.253	0.942
	(0.197)	(0.274)	(0.195)
Individual Economic Worries	0.541*	0.607#	1.179
	(0.133)	(0.170)	(0.283)
Racial Group Economic Worries	0.822	1.201	0.661
	(0.179)	(0.289)	(0.144)
National Economic Worries	1.264	1.216	0.928#
	(0.264)	(0.276)	(0.192)
Controls			
Church Attendance	1.029	0.935	1.085
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.076)
Black Protestant	1.581**	1.237	1.020
	(0.247)	(0.206)	(0.159)
College Graduate	0.572**	0.835	0.922
	(0.100)	(0.158)	(0.159)
Family Income	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age	1.001	1.001	1.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Women	0.875	1.306	0.536**
	(0.146)	(0.237)	(0.091)
South	0.896	1.132	1.012
	(0.147)	(0.199)	(0.167)
Interaction Effects			
Clergy Messages * Individual Economic Worries	1.888*	1.894*	1.218
	(0.525)	(0.528)	(0.338)
Clergy Messages * Racial Group Economic Worries	1.199	0.962	0.752
	(0.309)	(0.251)	(0.201)
Clergy Messages * National Economic Worries	1.146	0.917	1.818*
	(0.318)	(0.263)	(0.518)
Weight	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N=	756	756	756

#<.1, *<.05, **<.01; (Standard errors are in parentheses)

Table 4: Impact of Clergy Messages on African American Immigration Attitudes based upon concern for Individual and National Economic Well-being: Logit Regression Analyses: Odds Ratios

	Immigrant Take Jobs (Individual Economic Worries)	Immigrant Take Jobs (No Individual Economic Worries)	Support a Decrease in Immigrants (Individual Economic Worries)	Support a Decrease in Immigrants (No Individual Economic Worries)	Support Border Patrol (National Economic Worries)	Support Border Patrol (No National Economic Worries)
Clergy Political Messages	2.182**	1.127	2.383**	1.145	1.480**	0.872
	(0.578)	(0.145)	(0.661)	(0.154)	(0.209)	(0.182)
Individual Economic Worries	---	---	---	---	1.357	1.307
					(0.305)	(0.531)
Racial Group Economic Worries	1.471	1.385	0.971	1.280	0.905	0.656
	(0.602)	(0.272)	(0.430)	(0.266)	(0.180)	(0.259)
National Economic Worries	0.687	0.902	0.953	1.164	---	---
	(0.326)	(0.181)	(0.502)	(0.252)		
Controls						
Church Attendance	0.960	1.045	0.714	0.986	1.004	1.259
	(0.167)	(0.080)	(0.143)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.158)
Black Protestant	1.854	1.522*	1.907	1.080	1.355	0.668
	(0.686)	(0.265)	(0.766)	(0.201)	(0.262)	(0.183)
College Graduate	0.320*	0.643*	0.469	0.916	0.748	1.415
	(0.146)	(0.123)	(0.238)	(0.189)	(0.161)	(0.438)
Family Income	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age	1.003	1.002	0.996	1.003	1.009	0.995
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Women	1.267	0.814	1.670	1.257	0.556**	0.533*
	(0.516)	(0.152)	(0.748)	(0.254)	(0.115)	(0.164)
South	1.496	0.805	1.259	1.097	1.180	0.784
	(0.620)	(0.145)	(0.577)	(0.211)	(0.250)	(0.216)
Weight	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N=	156	600	156	600	487	257

#<.1, *<.05, **<.01; (Standard errors are in parentheses)

Table 5: Probability Estimates based upon Table 4 Logit Regression Analyses of the Impact of Clergy Messages on African American Immigration Attitudes

	Immigrant Take Jobs (Individual Economic Worries)	Immigrant Take Jobs (No Individual Economic Worries)	Support a Decrease in Immigrants (Individual Economic Worries)	Support a Decrease in Immigrants (No Individual Economic Worries)	Support Border Patrol (National Economic Worries)	Support Border Patrol (No National Economic Worries)
0 Political Messages	.33	.51	.17	.29	.49	.60
1 Political Messages	.52	.54	.33	.32	.59	.57
2 Political Messages	.71	.57	.54	.35	.68	.55
N=	156	600	156	600	487	269