In several papers Sharon Street has argued that evolution has a profound effect on what people take to be reasons for action. She then argues that if that is true and reasons for action are mind-independent, absurdities follow: either we are just incredibly lucky that what we take to be reasons for action really are or evolution has provided us with a mysterious faculty of intuition that puts us in touch with objective reasons that are strange metaphysical entities akin to Platonic forms. Against the first horn of her dilemma I argue that it is not absurd to think that what we initially take to be reasons for action do not coincide with what are objective reasons for action and that there is no reason to think that what we take to be reasons for action after reflection and when ideally situated do not coincide with what are objective reasons for action. Against her second horn, I argue that intuitions are not the product of a mysterious faculty but are based on our understanding of concepts, and they give us evidence for what are true propositions about what the objective reasons for action are. Finally, I offer counterexamples against the sort of mind-dependent view of reasons for action that Street and many others support.